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Abstract
We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model fea-
turing an ambiguous state distribution. Equilibrium behavior of both sender (S) and
receiver (R) features mixing and we relate each agent’s randomization to a specific
mode of ambiguous communication. For sufficiently high ambiguity, implementing
the S-optimal decision rule with only two messages is impossible if R has aligned
preferences. This may in contrast be possible if R has misaligned preferences. Adding
a little ambiguity may generate influential communication that is unambiguously ad-
vantageous to S.
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“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it means just
what I choose it to mean - nothing more nor less.”. “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you
can make words mean so many different things.”. (Lewis Carroll, Through the looking glass)
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21 Introduction
Many situations of advice feature uncertainty about the prior distribution of the state
of the world. In medical advice, the distribution of a particular disease across ethnic
groups may be unclear. In financial advice, the process governing the value of a given
asset may be unknown. We examine a binary cheap talk model featuring Knightean prior
uncertainty as well as ambiguity averse agents and we address the following questions.
First, how does the addition of ambiguity change the predictions of the classical cheap
talk model? Second, does the model generate features that are reminiscent of ambiguous
language? We review our findings in what follows.
A preliminary standard result is that agents strictly favour randomization for inter-
mediate (and thereby inconclusive) signal realizations, which allows to hedge in the face
of ambiguity. We start by focusing on equilibria that implement the optimal decision rule
of S (S-optimal equilibria). Our main objective is to establish the comparative statics of
the set of S-optimal equilibria with respect to preference misalignment, message space
cardinality and the ambiguity level. In our binary model, the natural measure of prefer-
ence misalignment between sender (S) and receiver (R) is β = qS   qR, where qi 2 (0, 1)
describes i’s relative sensitivity to type I and II errors (β  0 as we assume qR  qS). The
level of ambiguity is captured by a one dimensional parameter.
Our first main finding is that it is without loss of generality to concentrate on so-called
threshold equilibria. In the latter, S sends at most three messages and his communication
strategy is described by three thresholds and mixing probabilities computed on the basis
of qS and qR. In threshold equilibria S occasionally randomizes and his strategy cannot
be described as a partitional strategy à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS) but only as
mixing over a set of partitional strategies. R also typically randomizes. We interpret
randomization by respectively S and R as embodying two different modes of ambiguous
communication.
Our next class of findings concerns the impact of the message space cardinality on
the existence of S-optimal equilibria. If three messages are available, for any ambiguity
level there is a maximal bias eβ 2 (0, 1) such that an S-optimal equilibrium exists if and
only if β  eβ. Given high ambiguity, three messages are necessary for the existence of
3an S-optimal equilibrium independently of bias β. Given intermediate ambiguity there
is always an interval of biases
h
β, β
i
satisfying β < eβ for which two messages suffice. It
may furthermore be the case that β > 0, meaning that a low bias renders three messages
necessary. Finally, given low ambiguity two messages are always sufficient.
We add four remarks on the above class of findings. First, given intermediate ambi-
guity perfectly manipulating R thus requires more sophisticated language as β increases
from β 2
h
β, β
i
to β0 2 (β, eβ]. In this case, if we pick the S-optimal equilibrium as our pre-
diction for the game, more bias thus implies richer equilibrium language. This reverses
the prediction of the CS cheap talk model if we pick the finest equilibrium as the salient
prediction for the latter model. A second remark is that under high (resp. intermediate)
ambiguity the S-optimal equilibrium for sure (resp. potentially) does not exist if S and R
have identical preferences and only two messages are available. This is counterintuitive
and we term this the Doppelgänger Paradox. A third remark is that under intermediate
ambiguity the Doppelgänger Paradox, if arising, is compounded by the existence of an
S-optimal equilibrium if R is moderately biased (i.e. β 2
h
β, β
i
). A misaligned R is thus
preferable to S than a perfectly aligned R. We term this the strong Doppelgänger Paradox.
A fourth and final remark is that the above features do not obtain in the absence of am-
biguity. In a model featuring two actions, two messages always suffice to implement the
(potentially mixed) S-optimal decision rule if S and R have identical preferences.
A third main finding is that there typically now also exist influential communication
equilibria that do not implement the S-optimal decision rule, in contrast to the case of
no ambiguity. A fourth main finding is that adding a little ambiguity, starting from no
ambiguity, can generate the possibility of influential communication and additionally be
unambiguously beneficial to S.
Literature review Ambiguous language arguably lacks a theoretical explanation: Ex-
isting models that explicitly purport to study ambiguous communication actually gen-
erate vagueness (see for example Alesina and Cukierman (1990), Aragonès and Neeman
(2000), Callander and Wilson (2008), Tomz and Van Houweling (2009)). In contrast, we
find the forms of randomization (by S and R) featured in S-optimal equilibria of our game
reminiscent of two common modes of ambiguous communication. In this light, we pro-
vide a simple account of ambiguous language as the equilibrium implication of ambiguity
4in priors.
Our contribution lies at the intersection on the literatures on respectively cheap talk
communication and ambiguity. The first was initiated by the seminal model of Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982). The endogenous randomization over messages inducing different
beliefs featured in our model bears a relation to the exogenous randomization studied
in Board, Blume and Kawamura (2007). In the latter model, an emitted message may be
randomly swapped with another during the transmission process. The authors show that
this exogenous randomization may be welfare beneficial. Note however that if the sender
had access to non noisy messages he would strictly favour these over noisy messages.
Blume and Board (2010, 2012) offer a further exploration of the concepts introduced in
Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007).
Our paper also relates to the literature of ambiguity. We model ambiguity based on
the Max-Min model (Gilboa (1987), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). It is well-known that
no common practice on updating of ambiguity averse preferences has yet emerged. We
refer to Siniscalchi (2011) as well as Hanany and Klibanoff (2007, 2009) for a discussion
of this issue. Recently, ambiguity has been brought to strategic settings by a number
of authors. Bade (2010), Riedel and Sass (2011), Azrieli and Teper (2011) and Hanany,
Klibanoff and Mukerji (2015) define general equilibrium concepts under ambiguity. A
large array of papers study more specific applications to finance, tournaments or contract
theory. Somewhat more related contributions include a number of studies of mechanism
design under ambiguity (Bose and Renou (2011), Di Tillio et al. (2011)). The latter contri-
butions, in applying the revelation principle, analyze a messaging game in the presence
of ambiguity. Finally, Kellner and Le Quement (2015) analyze ambiguous (Ellsbergian)
communication strategies within the CS model and find that for any standard influen-
tial equilibrium, there exists an Ellsbergian equilibrium ensuring both S and R a strictly
higher ex ante expected payoff. Ambiguity, by triggering Max-Min decision making, acts
as a beneficial commitment device for R.
52 The model
There are two agents, a sender S and a receiver R. The state of the world ω 2 fA, Bg has
a subjectively uncertain distribution represented by a set [Pl(B), Ph(B)] of prior probabil-
ities of state B. We assume that Ph(B) = 12 + e and Pl(B) =
1
2   e, for some e 2

0, 12

. R
can choose among two actions a and b.
Preferences given a unique prior In the absence of ambiguity the preferences of each
agent i 2 fS, Rg are described by a parameter qi 2 (0, 1)which denotes an agent’s relative
aversion to type I and type I I errors. Payoffs to agent i 2 fS, Rg are given by pii (b, A) =
 qi, pii (a, B) =   (1  qi) and pii (a, A) = pii (b, B) = 0. Define Pk(B j θ) as the posterior
probability of B given information event θ and prior Pk(B) 2 fPl(B), Ph(B)g. Define
Ek (pii(j,ω) j θ) as the expected payoff of action j for agent i given information event θ
and prior Pk(B) 2 fPl(B), Ph(B)g:
Ek (pii(b,ω) j θ) =  qi(1  Pk(B j θ))
Ek (pii(a,ω) j θ) =  (1  qi)Pk(B j θ),
meaning that for a given prior Pk(B) and a given information event θ, an ambiguity
neutral agent i strictly favours action b over a if Pk(B j θ) > qi and a over b if Pk(B j θ) < qi.
An ambiguity neutral agent thus always strictly prefers a pure action except in the knife-
edge case where qi = Pk(B j θ). Preference parameters qS and qR are public information
and qR  qS.
Preferences given multiple priors Let (αa, αb) denote the mixed action assigning prob-
ability αa to a and probability αb to b. An agent chooses the mixed action (αa , αb) that max-
imizes the minimal expected payoff across all possible priors given information event θ.
Letting ∆ab be the set of all distributions over the action space fa, bg , α satisfies
α 2 arg max
α2∆ab
min
k2fl,hg ∑j2fa,bg
αjEk (pii(j,ω) j θ) .
Note that in characterizing the Max-Min action we trivially only need to consider the
most extreme (updated) priors Pl(B j θ) and Ph(B j θ) because the expected payoff of
action j is increasing in the probability of state J. It is easily seen that the Max-Min action
6α is characterized as follows. If Ph(B jθ ) < q then αa = 1. If Pl(B jθ ) < q < Ph(B jθ )
then αa = q. If q < Pl(B jθ ) then αa = 0. If Ph(B jθ ) = q there is a set of Max-Min
actions defined by αa 2 [q, 1] . If Pl(B jθ ) = q there is a set of Max-Min actions defined by
αa 2 [0, q] .
Information structure S receives a one dimensional signal σ drawn from a state de-
pendent continuous distribution Fω(σ) with density function fω(σ) on a domain [σ, σ] .
We allow both for a bounded domain (for example [σ, σ] = [0, 1]) or an unbounded do-
main (for example σ =  ∞ and σ = +∞). FA(σ) and FB(σ) are such that fB(σ)fA(σ) is strictly
increasing in σ, thus satisfying the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). We in-
troduce the following useful condition on the distribution of signals:
Assumption 1 8σ 2 (σ, σ) , it holds true that
FB(σ)
FA(σ)
∂

FB(σ)
FA(σ)

∂σ
>
fB(σ)
fA(σ)
∂

fB(σ)
fA(σ)

∂σ
and
1 FB(σ)
1 FA(σ)
∂

1 FB(σ)
1 FA(σ)

∂σ
>
fB(σ)
fA(σ)
∂

fB(σ)
fA(σ)

∂σ
, (1)
For σ 2 fσ, σg, the above inequality conditions hold true with weak inequalities.
Assumption 1 is equivalent to log-concavity of the inverse Mills ratios if for all σ,
fB(σ) = fA(σ  c) for some positive constant c. An instance of this is when fB and fA are
two normal distributions with identical variance and means µA < µB.
Assumption 2: It holds true that lim
σ!σ
fB(σ)
fA(σ)
= 0 and lim
σ!σ
fB(σ)
fA(σ)
= +∞.
Assumption 2 is satisfied for a pair of normals as described above. Assumptions 1
and 2 are also satisfied if fB(σ) = 2
σ σ
(σ σ)2 and fA(σ) = 2
σ σ
(σ σ)2 (which will be assumed
together with [σ, σ] = [0, 1] in our figures).
Communication protocol and equilibrium The timing of the game G is given as fol-
lows. At 0, Nature draws the state ω. At 1, Nature draws a signal according to Fω. At 2,
S issues a message. At 3, R chooses an action. S can communicate costlessly with R by
emitting a message m 2 M, where M is a set of cardinality n  2 in which individual mes-
sages are numbered m1, ..., mn. A communication strategy δ of S specifies for each signal
σ a distribution (δ1(σ), .., δn(σ)) over messages belonging to M, where δj(σ) is the prob-
ability of sending mj. A decision strategy ρ of R specifies a distribution (ρa(m), ρb(m))
over fa, bg for each possible message m in M. A Weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
7the game G is given by: 1) a communication strategy δ of S, 2) a decision strategy ρ of
R and 3) a system of beliefs satisfying the following two requirements. First, δ and ρ
are sequentially rational given the system of beliefs. Second, posterior beliefs for both S
and R are generated whenever possible by using prior-by-prior Bayesian updating using
equilibrium strategies.
Sequential rationality of ρ implies that R picks an action in the set of Max-Min actions
given the posteriors fPl(B jm, δ ), Ph(B jm, δ )g . Let Ek (piS jm, ρ, σ ) denote the expected
payoff of S under the prior Pk(B) at information set σ if R uses the decision strategy ρ. Let
∆M be the set of all distributions over M. Sequential rationality of δ requires that at any
signal σ
δ 2 arg max
δ2∆M
min
k2fl,hg
n
∑
r=1
δr(σ)Ek (piS jmr, ρ, σ ) . (2)
We say that an equilibrium is influential if there exist two equilibrium messages m
and m0 that trigger different beliefs and actions (i.e. ρa(m) 6= ρa(m0)). We say that two
equilibria are outcome-equivalent if they implement the same decision rule, i.e. the same
mapping from [σ, σ] to the set ∆ab of distributions over fa, bg. Outcome equivalence thus
does not take into account how a given distribution over fa, bg is attached to a given
signal σ in equilibrium, i.e. who randomizes.
The expected Max-Min payoff of agent i at σ in equilibrium ϕ is the expected value
of the Max-Min payoff obtained by i given σ in ϕ. To exemplify the concept, consider an
equilibrium ϕ in which conditional on signal σ, R receives message m1 with probability
p1(σ) and m2 with probability p2 (σ) = 1  p1 (σ). Let bΠϕ(mj) denote R’s Max-Min payoff
given mj in ϕ. It follows that in ϕ, R’s expected Max-Min payoff at σ is p1(σ)bΠϕ(m1) +
p2(σ)bΠϕ(m2). We say that two equilibria ϕ and eϕ are σ-interim payoff equivalent for agent
i if he obtains the same expected Max-Min payoff at every σ 2 [σ, σ] in ϕ and eϕ. We say
that equilibrium ϕ σ-interim payoff dominates equilibrium eϕ for agent i if for every signal σ,
agent i obtains a weakly higher expected Max-Min Payoff (with strict inequality for some
signal) in ϕ than in eϕ.
Note that in the presence of ambiguity, two equilibria may be outcome equivalent
without being σ-interim payoff equivalent for a given agent i.
The next section provides an analysis of our model. A subsequent section shows that
8our model is formally equivalent to one involving a continuum of pure actions.
3 Analysis
3.1 Opening remarks
We start with a characterization of agents’ optimal decision rules. Given Assumption
2, there exist for each agent i and ambiguity level e 2

0, 12

two thresholds t1i (e) 2
(σ, σ) and t2i (e) 2 (σ, σ) satisfying the following 
1
2   e
1
2 + e
!
fB(t1i (e))
fA(t1i (e))
=
 
1
2 + e
1
2   e
!
fB(t2i (e))
fA(t2i (e))
=
qi
1  qi .
Note that lim
e!0
t1i (e) = lime!0
t2i (e) and t
1
i (e) < t
2
i (e) for e 2

0, 12

.
The thresholds are key to determining agent i’s optimal (Max-Min) action as a function
of signal σ. For σ < t1i (e) agent i strictly favours a. For σ 2
 
t1i (e), t
2
i (e)

agent i strictly
favours the mixed action (qi, 1  qi) . For σ > t2i (e) agent i strictly favours action b. At
σ = t1i (e) there is a set of Max-Min actions given by (ρa, 1   ρa) s.t. ρa 2 [qR, 1] . At
σ = t2i (e) there is a set of Max-Min actions given by (ρa, 1  ρa) s.t. ρa 2 [0, qR] . Each
agent i thus has a (continuum) set of optimal decision rules that differ only regarding
the action picked at the measure zero events σ = t1i (e) and σ = t
2
i (e). For all practical
purposes (i.e. implementability and payoffs) all rules in this set are identical and slightly
abusing vocabulary we shall henceforth define as the S-optimal decision rule the rule in this
set that specifies action (qS, 1  qS) at σ = t1S(e) and σ = t2S(e).
On a technical note, it is immediate that for any e > 0 we have t1R(e) < t
1
S(e) and
t2R(e) < t
2
S(e) if qR < qS. t
1
S(e) and t
2
S(e) are respectively strictly decreasing and increasing
in e. Also, lim
e!0
t1S(e) = lime!0
t2S(e) 2 (σ, σ) while lim
e! 12
t1S(e) = σ and lim
e! 12
t2S(e) = σ. The latter
two limits imply that for ω 2 fA, Bg , lim
e! 12
Fω(t1S(e)) = 0 and lim
e! 12
1  Fω(t2S(e)) = 0.
Let tS = lim
e!0
t1S(e) = lime!0
t2S(e). Equilibrium behavior in the absence of ambiguity is very
simple except in the knife-edge case P(B jσ  tS) ) = qR. If there exists an equilibrium
featuring influential communication then it implements S’s optimal decision rule which is
9furthermore deterministic. S simply announces truthfully his favoured action by sending
m1 when favouring a and m2 when favouring b. R takes action a after m1 and b after m2.
This equilibrium only exists if R is willing to take action a after m1, which requires that
qR is not excessively low1.
In what follows, we perform an analysis of the set of influential equilibria under am-
biguity. The set consists of two separate subsets, those equilibria that implement the
S-optimal decision rule (S-optimal equilibria) and those that do not.
3.2 S-optimal equilibria
We start with the following two observations.
Lemma 1 a) If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium
satisfying the following. No more than three messages are sent. Conditional on a given equilibrium
message, R either picks pure action a or pure action b or mixed action (qR, 1  qR).
b) If qR < qS, there exists no S-optimal equilibrium in which S never randomizes.
The intuition behind a) is that one can w.l.o.g. focus on S-optimal equilibria in which
R only takes three different actions: (1, 0), (0, 1) and (qR, 1  qR). A full proof is given in
the Appendix. The argument behind b) is as follows. For intermediate signal realizations
S favours the mixed action (qS, 1  qS) . In a putative S-optimal equilibrium in which S
would never randomize, one message would have to trigger mixed action (qS, 1  qS).
Yet we show in the proof of a) that there cannot exist an S-optimal equilibrium in which
R chooses this mixed action.
Exhaustively characterizing the set of S-optimal equilibria is both daunting and un-
necessary for our purposes. We now introduce a simple subclass of S-optimal equilibria
and show that we may w.l.o.g. restrict ourselves to it. In what follows, note that we
simply write tiS instead of t
i
S(e) whenever no confusion can arise.
Definition 1 Threshold equilibrium
1In the knife edge case where P(B jσ  tS ) = qR, there exists for every x 2 [0, 1] an equilibrium imple-
menting the following decision rule. Pick b with probability x if σ  tS and b for sure if σ > tS.
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a) A threshold equilibrium with threshold z 2 (t1S, t2S] (also threshold-z equilibrium) involves
the following strategy profile. S emits m1 if σ < t1S and m2 if σ > t
2
S. If σ 2 [t1S, z), S emits m1
with probability qS qR1 qR and m3 with probability
1 qS
1 qR . If σ 2

z, t2S

, S emits m1 with probability
qS and m2 with probability 1  qS. R chooses a after m1, b after m2 and mixed action (qR, 1  qR)
after m3.
b) A threshold equilibrium with threshold z = t1S involves the following strategy profile. S
emits m1 if σ < t1S and m2 if σ > t
2
S. If σ 2 [t1S, t2S], S emits m1 with probability qS and m2 with
probability 1  qS. R chooses a after m1, b after m2.
Threshold equilibria feature a communication strategy that is entirely described by
the three thresholds

t1S, z, t
2
S
	
and a set of mixing probabilities. We call such a strategy a
threshold communication strategy. A threshold equilibrium in which z = t1S implies the
emission with positive probability of exactly two messages while any remaining thresh-
old equilibrium implies that three messages are emitted with positive probability. Given
qS, qR, e, let Pk(B jmi, z ) denote the conditional probability of B implied by mi given prior
Pk(B) and the threshold strategy z.
All threshold equilibria are outcome equivalent as they all implement S’s optimal de-
cision rule. Though not stated explicitly in what follows, note that the set of threshold
equilibria typically constitutes a continuum. Many different threshold communication
strategies of S allow him to optimally guide R’s actions. This multiplicity reflects the fact
that there are two ways to trigger the optimal randomization by R in threshold equilibria,
a simple and a more sophisticated way. The first is to randomize between m1 and m2. The
second is to randomize between m1 and m3 (where m3 leads to randomization by R). The
two ways are perfect substitutes for S.
All threshold equilibria are σ-interim payoff equivalent for S but this is not the case for
R though no σ-interim payoff dominance relation appears to trivially hold across thresh-
old equilibria. By transiting from threshold z to z0 > z, R’s expected Max-Min payoff
increases for sure for any σ /2 [z, z0) but may instead decrease for σ 2 [z, z0). In a thresh-
old equilibrium, m1 and m2 yield a Max-Min payoff strictly larger than qR(1  qR)which
is furthermore respectively decreasing in Ph(B jm1, z ) and increasing in Pl(B jm2, z ). Mes-
sage m3 instead always yields the Max-Min payoff qR(1  qR). R thus favours messages
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triggering a pure action (m1 and m2) over m3. Note that when transiting from threshold
z to z0 > z, at signals σ 2 [z, z0) randomization over m1 and m2 is replaced by random-
ization over m1 and m3. For R, the downside of threshold z0 is thus the increased use of
m3. The upside is that Ph(B jm1, z ) and Pl(B jm2, z ) are respectively decreasing and in-
creasing in z (see Appendix), meaning that the Max-Min payoff induced by m1 and m2 is
increased. We see no strong reason that the above trade-off should always play out in the
same direction.
We attach three technical remarks on the randomization performed by S in thresh-
old equilibria and S-optimal equilibria in general. First, in the classical CS model, any
partitional equilibrium can be reinterpreted as an equilibrium in which S mixes between
messages, but such mixing only involves messages that cause identical beliefs and iden-
tical actions. The involved mixing is therefore unnecessary as opposed to the mixing that
appears in the S-optimal equilibria of our model, which cannot be disposed of as shown
in Lemma 1.b). Second, the randomization performed by S in S-optimal equilibria differs
from that featured in the noisy talk model of Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007) to the
extent that randomization in our model is voluntary while it is exogenously generated in
the noisy talk model. Third, the mixing performed by S in a threshold equilibrium can be
reinterpreted as mixing over a set of classical partitional communication strategies upon
observation of his private signal.
We wish to characterize the comparative statics of the set of S-optimal equilibria. Key
questions are: 1) What are the values of qR compatible with the existence of an S-optimal
equilibrium and how do these values vary as a function of the ambiguity level e? 2) Does
S sometimes need strictly more than two messages to implement his optimal decision
rule? Proposition 1 below implies that in seeking to answer the above questions, we may
restrict ourselves without loss of generality to the subset of threshold equilibria.
Proposition 1 S-optimal equilibria and threshold equilibria
a) If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists a threshold equilibrium.
b) Given only two available messages, any S-optimal equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium
with threshold t1S.
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Point a) is proved in the Appendix. The proof of b) is as follows. In an S-optimal
equilibrium featuring only two equilibrium messages, one message (say m1) must trigger
action a for sure and another (say m2) must trigger b for sure. This is necessary to allow S
to induce a for sure below t1S and b for sure above t
2
S. There being no third message avail-
able, it follows that for σ 2 t1S, t2S S randomizes with probability (qS, 1  qS) between m1
and m2 . The described strategy profile is a threshold equilibrium profile with threshold
t1S.
Before stating our characterizations in the next two propositions we introduce con-
stants e1, e2, e12, e13 2

0, 12

which shall constitute building blocks of our statements.
Given qS, qR, e, let Pk(B jmi, z, e ) denote the conditional probability of B implied by mi
given prior Pk(B) and the threshold strategy z. Given any quintuple qS, qR, e, i, k, it can
be shown that lim
z!t1S(e)
Pk(B jmi, z, e ) is independent of qR. Slightly abusing notation, we let
Pk(B
mi, t1S(e), e ) = lim
z!t1S(e)
Pk(B jmi, z, e ) given qS, e, i, k. Constant e1 is s.t. as e increases,
Ph(B
m1, t1S(e), e ) crosses qS from below at e1. e2 is s.t. as e increases, Pl(B m2, t1S(e), e )
crosses qS from above at e2. e13 is s.t. as e increases Ph(B
m1, t1S(e), e ) crosses Pl(B m3, t1S(e), e )
from below at e = e13. Finally, e12 is s.t Ph(B
m1, t1S(e), e ) crosses Pl(B m2, t1S(e), e ) from
below at e = e12. The constants satisfy the following. First, if e1 6= e2 then e12 is strictly
between e1 and e2 while if e1 = e2 then e12 = e1. Second, e13 < minfe12, e1g. Note that
the constants are constructed for a fixed qS and fixed distributions FA and FB. For more
detail, we refer to the Online Appendix.
The following proposition offers a characterization of the comparative statics of the
set of S-optimal equilibria in the presence of three messages.
Proposition 2 S-optimal equilibria (three messages available)
Suppose that three messages are available.
i. Fix qS. For any given e there is a strictly positive threshold qR(e) < qS such that there exists
an S-optimal equilibrium if and only if qR 2
h
q
R
(e), qS
i
.
ii. For all e  e13, qR(e) is continuous and strictly increasing in e.
Proof: see in Appendix.
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Point i. implies that an S-optimal equilibrium exists if and only if qR is not too low rel-
ative to qS. Point ii. shows that when three messages are available, increasing ambiguity
is not helpful in so far as S’s ability to implement his optimal decision rule is concerned.
In certain situations, communication is restricted to the use binary messages. An ex-
pert may for example be allowed only to say "yes" or "no". We now characterize the set
of conflict levels under which S-optimal communication remains possible under this re-
striction. Note in what follows that q
R
(e) is the lower bound defined in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 S-optimal equilibria (only two messages available)
Suppose that exactly two messages are available.
i. Let qS be such that e2 < e1. The following holds true.
i.a) If e > e12, there exists no S-optimal equilibrium for any qR while instead if e  e12, there
are strictly positive thresholds q0
R
(e) and q0R(e) satisfying q0R(e)  q
0
R(e)  qS such that there
exists an S-optimal equilibrium if and only if qR 2
h
q0
R
(e), q0R(e)
i
.
i.b) q0
R
(e) = q
R
(e) if e  e13 while instead q0R(e) > qR(e) if e 2 (e13, e12].
i.c) q0R(e) = qS if e  e2 while instead q0R(e) < qS if e 2 (e2, e12].
i.d) For any e  e12, q0R(e) is continuous and strictly increasing in e and q
0
R(e) is continuous
and weakly decreasing in e.
ii. Let qS be such that e2  e1. Statements of Point i. apply with the following modifications.
First, constant e12 is everywhere replaced by e1. Second, Point i.c) is replaced by: q0R(e) = qS for
e 2 (0, e1].
Proof: see in Appendix.
Note that if assuming [σ, σ] = [0, 1], fB(σ) = 2σ and fA(σ) = 2  2σ, it holds true that
e2 < e1 iff qS > 12 . Figure 1 below illustrates Propositions 2 and 3 for this signal struc-
ture, assuming qS = .66. The horizontally striped area indicates pairs (e, qR) for which
there exists an S-optimal equilibrium if only two messages are available. The diagonally
striped area indicates pairs (e, qR) for which there exists an S-optimal equilibrium if three
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messages are available.
Figure 1: Message number and S-optimal equilibria.
On the usefulness of a third message Proposition 3 shows that the absence of a third
message hurts S in terms of his ability to implement his optimal decision rule whenever
ambiguity is sufficiently high. We focus on the statements of i., those of ii. being quali-
tatively virtually identical with one exception which is discussed later. Point i.a) shows
that if ambiguity is large (e > e12), the S-optimal rule can never be implemented in the
absence of a third message. Points i.b) and i.c) show that if e is smaller than e12, there is
a closed interval
h
q0
R
(e), q0R(e)
i
of values of qR such that an S-optimal equilibrium exists
if and only if qR belongs to this interval. Point i.b) shows that the lower bound q0R(e)
is strictly higher than q
R
(e) if e 2 (e13, e12) and i.c) states that the upper bound q0R(e) is
strictly smaller than qS if e 2 (e2, e12). If e 2 (max fe13,e2g , e12) , a third message is thus
useful if and only if R is either very aligned or very misaligned. For e  minfe13,e2g, on
the other hand, a third message is always superfluous. Finally, i.c) shows that given only
two messages, adding a little ambiguity in the environment is never helpful in so far as
S’s ability to implement his optimal decision rule is concerned. Indeed, the bounds q0
R
(e)
and q0R(e) are respectively increasing and decreasing in e.
At an abstract level, the usefulness of a third message derives from the following two
features of the game. First, given ambiguity aversion agents’ optimal decision rules in-
volve three types of behavior, either a or b or mixing. Both agents favour a when the
signal is low, b when it is high, and hedging (though with different probabilities) when
it is intermediate. If ambiguity is high, there is a common interval of signal realizations
where both agents want to randomize. For S, being able to convey whether he wants to
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randomize can thus naturally be helpful. If ambiguity is instead low, there is no common
interval of signals for which both agents want to randomize.
A Doppelgänger Paradox A salient aspect of our characterization is that for e large
enough (a sufficient condition being e  min fe1, e12g), there exists no S-optimal equilib-
rium for qS = qR when S is restricted to using only two messages. We call this phenom-
enon Doppelgänger Paradox and add some remarks on this in what follows.
First, if qR = qS, one would expect that there exists a threshold equilibrium with
threshold t1S(e), thus making the restriction to two messages inconsequential. The intu-
ition for this would be as follows. In such a putative equilibrium, R chooses a after m1 and
b after m2. S simply randomizes optimally between m1 and m2 whenever σ 2

t1S(e), t
2
S(e)

and otherwise chooses m1 or m2. R, recognizing that his optimal decision rule coincides
with that of S, should have no deviation incentive. This intuition is however wrong.
Under the assumed updating rule, R simply applies his own optimal (ambiguity averse)
Max-Min best response to the received message. The fact that in the postulated equilib-
rium S has already acted in a way that maximized his own (ambiguity averse) preferences
is immaterial. The fact that in equilibrium S successfully hedges against ambiguity does
not imply that R is also hedged against ambiguity. The key here is the dynamic inconsis-
tency of R’s behavior given the assumed updating rule. Following Hanany and Klibanoff
(2007) one could alleviate the paradox by excluding certain priors at certain information
sets of R.
For comparison, consider a Bayesian game under expected utility between two players
(1 and 2) each endowed with two actions. Assume that in equilibrium, agent 1 random-
izes for some types. Suppose that agent 1 cannot act himself but needs to act through
a third agent (R) with identical preferences (a Doppelgänger). Communication between
agent 1 and R is cheap talk. Under expected utility, a third message would never be nec-
essary to allow agent 1 to implement his desired decision rule through R. Agent 1 would
simply optimally randomize between two messages inducing pure actions by R and the
latter would have no incentive to deviate.
A second specificity of the model is that given only two messages, an increased pref-
erence misalignment can be helpful for S. Given qS such that e2 < e1 and e 2 (e2, e12], an
S-optimal equilibrium does not exist for qR = qS but exists for an interval of values of qR
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strictly smaller than qS (see Figure 1). One might call this the strong Doppelgänger para-
dox. Note that the latter does not arise if e2  e1 (corresponding to Point ii. in Proposition
3). Under expected utility, an increase in R’s bias would in contrast always hurt S for any
fixed message space cardinality.
Interpreting S-optimal equilibria The randomization performed by respectively S or
by R in threshold equilibria relates to two common modes of ambiguous communica-
tion, each offering an instance of the multiplicity of interpretations that is in our view the
essence of ambiguous language. The first mode operates through the ambiguity arising
in deriving the implications of the perceived language through a process of introspection
(What shall I do given what I heard?). The second mode operates through the ambiguity
arising in perceiving language through a process of extrospection (What have I actually
heard?).
We expand on the first mode in what follows. In a threshold equilibrium with z >
t1S(e), when S sends the partitional message m3 that gives rise to randomization by R, this
is somewhat equivalent to S taking an agnostic stance, stating "I recommend neither a nor
b." or "Whether a or b is optimal is a matter of perspective.". A caveat is that m3 is admittedly a
classical partitional message à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) but the partition is a specific
one: It exclusively contains intermediate signals and by definition triggers randomization
by R. By sending m3, S conveys the inconclusiveness of his own information.
We now comment on the second mode. When S mixes between messages trigger-
ing different beliefs and responses, this bears some similarity to the choice of versatile
formulations that give rise to a distribution over perceived statements. Suppose that be-
sides the classical messages m1, m2 and m3, S also has access to non standard messages
which induce a distribution over the observation by R of respectively m1, m2 and m3. Letem(x1, x2, x3) induce R to see mi with probability xi for i = 1, 2, 3, with x1 + x2 + x3 = 1.
Call any such message a noisy message and let it be common knowledge that S has access
to a rich set of such messages, one for each (x1, x2, x3) s.t. x1 + x2 + x3 = 1. Suppose that
there exists a simple threshold equilibrium featuring z = t1S and thus making use only
of standard messages. It follows immediately that there exists an equilibrium in which
S is known to use the following communication strategy. He sends m1 if σ < t1S, m2 if
σ > t2S and sends the noisy message em(qS, 1  qS, 0) if σ 2 t1S, t2S. Similarly, if there exists
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a threshold equilibrium featuring z 2 (t1S, t2S), then there exists an equilibrium in which S
sends m1 if σ < t1S, m2 if σ > t
2
S, the noisy message em  qS qR1 qR , 0, 1 qS1 qR if σ 2 t1S, z and
the noisy message em(qS, 1  qS, 0) if σ 2 z, t2S.
We add two remarks on equilibria featuring noisy messages. First, note that R is aware
of the fact that these messages are being used. He recognizes that he sees a standard
message m1, m2 or m3 but that S may in fact have sent a noisy message. Equilibria fea-
turing noisy messages thus involve fully rational agents. Second, the use of noisy mes-
sages allows to solve the implicit commitment problem inherent to the randomization
performed by S. Recall that a Max-Min decision maker is typically not indifferent be-
tween the two actions that he randomizes between if randomization is optimal. Noisy
messages in essence allow S to delegate the task of randomizing to an outside garbling
device.
3.3 Non S-optimal equilibria
Recall that the set of influential and non S-optimal equilibria is generically empty in the
absence of ambiguity. This is not the case anymore in the presence of ambiguity. Decision
rule D(qS, qR, e) is defined as follows. Action a is picked with probability qR if σ < t2S(e). b
is played with probability one if σ  t2S(e). Consider the following strategy profile which
implements D. S emits m1 if σ < t2S(e) and m2 if σ  t2S(e). R chooses mixed action
(qR, 1  qR) after m1 and b after m2. When this profile constitutes an equilibrium we call
it the simple D-equilibrium. Recall in what follows that q
R
(e) is the lower bound defined in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 Existence of a simple D-equilibrium
i. Fix qS. For any e 2 (0, 12) there are strictly positive thresholds qDR (e) and q
D
R (e) sat-
isfying qD
R
(e) < qDR (e)  qS such that the simple D-equilibrium exists if and only if qR 2h
qD
R
(e) , qDR (e)
i
.
ii. lim
e!0
qD
R
(e) = lim
e!0
q
R
(e) . For e 2 (0, 12), qDR (e) is continuous and strictly decreasing in e
and qDR (e) is continuous and weakly increasing in e.
Proof: See in Appendix.
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Point ii. shows that the addition of a little ambiguity may allow for the emergence of
the simple D-equilibrium. Figure 2 below considers the same parameter values as Figure
1. The diagonally striped area indicates pairs (e, qR) for which there exists an S-optimal
equilibrium if three messages are available. The vertically striped area indicates pairs
(e, qR) for which the simple D-equilibrium exists.
Figure 2: S-optimal equilibrium and simple D-equilibrium.
3.4 The virtues of a little ambiguity
In what follows, we let q
R
(0) = lim
e!0
q
R
(e) , where q
R
(e) is the lower bound defined in
Proposition 2. Recall that in the absence of ambiguity (e = 0), only the babbling equilib-
rium exists given qR < qR (0). For qR slightly below qR (0) , the next proposition eval-
uates the welfare properties of the influential communication rendered possible by the
addition of a little ambiguity. To that end, we compare the expected payoff obtained by
agent i in the babbling equilibrium under no ambiguity to that obtained by i in the simple
D-equilibrium under ambiguity level e when applying his most adverse prior.
Proposition 5 Fix qS < 12 . There is an e
 > 0 and for any e 2 (0, e) there is a thresholdbq
R
(e) < q
R
(0) such that if e 2 (0, e) and qR 2
hbq
R
(e), q
R
(0)

then:
a) The simple D-equilibrium exists.
b) For any prior P (B) 2 Pel (B), Peh(B) the expected utility of S is strictly larger in the
simple D-equilibrium than in the babbling equilibrium in the absence of ambiguity.
Proof: See in Appendix.
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Our proposition shows that for qR close enough to qR (0) and e small enough, the ad-
dition of a little ambiguity not only generates the possibility of influential communication
but also ensures S an increase in expected payoff under any prior in

Pel (B), P
e
h(B)

. This
conclusion does not apply for R who may well lose under both priors from the transition
to positive ambiguity and influential communication.
Figure 3 below illustrates the proposition. We assume the same information structure
as in previous figures and set qS = .45. The diagonally striped area indicates parame-
ters for which there exists an equilibrium implementing the S-optimal decision rule. The
vertically striped area denotes parameter values for which the simple D-equilibrium ex-
ists. The plain grey area denotes parameters for which 1) qR < qR (0) , 2) the simple
D-equilibrium exists and 3) the latter improves the expected payoff of S under any prior
in

Pel (B), P
e
h(B)

w.r.t. to babbling under no ambiguity.
Figure 3: Adding a little ambiguity.
4 Extension to a continuum of actions
We now show that our model is formally equivalent to a model involving a continuum
of pure actions. We refer to the jury interpretation of our setup. Let states A and B
correspond to the defendant being respectively innocent and guilty. Define furthermore
T as the maximal detention time (in years) to which the latter can be sentenced. For every
x 2 [0, 1] , let action x consist in detaining the defendant for xT years. Given a state
ω 2 fA, Bg and a given action x 2 [0, 1], let payoffs to agent i 2 fS, Rg be given by
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pii (x, A) =  qix, pii (x, B) =   (1  qi) (1  x). Defining Ek (pii(x,ω) j θ) as the expected
payoff of action x for agent i given information event θ and prior Pk(B), we now have:
Ek (pii(x,ω) j θ) =  qix (1  Pk(B j θ))  (1  qi)(1  x)Pk(B j θ). (3)
Note two features. Within this modified model, the expected payoff of the pure action
x is the same as the expected payoff of the mixed action assigning probability x to pure
action 1 and 1  x to 0. Secondly, (3) is the expected payoff of the mixed action (1  x, x)
in our original model. It follows trivially from this second observation that the optimal
decision rule of an agent in this setup mirrors the one featured in the original model
given Pk(B j θ). First, choose 0 for sure if Ph(B jθ ) < q. Second, choose pure action 1  q
or randomize over f0, 1g with probability (q, 1  q) if Pl(B jθ )  q  Ph(B jθ ). Finally,
choose 1 if q < Pl(B jθ ).
For every threshold equilibrium with threshold z in the original model, there is an
outcome equivalent equilibrium in this model that differs from the former only to the
extent that R now picks the pure action 1  qR instead of randomizing, thus avoiding the
implicit commitment problem associated with randomization in the original model. In
contrast, S can still not dispense of mixing between equilibrium messages, which shows
that mixing is not an artefact of the binary action space assumed in the original setup.
Lemma 2 There exists no S-optimal equilibrium in which S never randomizes between messages.
Proof: Identical to that of Lemma 1.b) and therefore omitted.
5 Conclusion
We have established the basic properties of a simple binary cheap talk model within an
ambiguous environment. From a formal perspective, the main novel feature of equilibria
is that S often randomizes between messages that trigger different (pure or mixed) actions
by R. The communication strategy of S is thus not reducible to a simple partitional strat-
egy. Other key properties relate to the comparative statics effect of interest misalignment,
language richness and exogenous ambiguity.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1.a)
Outline Step 1 shows that we can restrict ourselves to equilibria in which any given action
of R is triggered only by one equilibrium message. Step 2 shows that there cannot exist an
S-Optimal equilibrium in which R after some message chooses a mixed action (α, 1  α)
s.t. α 2 (qR, 1). Step 3 shows that it is w.l.o.g. to assume that no message triggers a mixed
action (α, 1  α) s.t. α 2 (0, qR) and concludes.
We recall the following notation. Given communication strategy δ we denote by δi(σ)
the likelihood that message mi is sent given signal σ. Assuming that communication strat-
egy δ uses finitely many messages given by m1, .., mn, it thus holds true that
n
∑
r=1
δr(σ) = 1
for any σ. We denote a given communication strategy by δ = (δ1, δ2, .., δn).
Step 1 Let δ be featured in an S-optimal equilibrium E. Assume that given δ, mr and mr0
are both sent with positive probability and trigger the same mixed action (α, 1  α). Consider the
strategy eδ constructed as follows. Set eδr(σ) = δr(σ) + δr0(σ) and eδr0(σ) = 0. Set eδr00(σ) =
δr00(σ) for any r00 6= r, r0. There exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring δ0.
Proof: Note that given ω, r,r0 it holds true that
P(mr
ω,eδ ) = P(mr jω, δ ) + P(mr0 jω, δ ). (4)
Suppose that mr and mr0 trigger pure action a given δ. Then it must be that for s = r, r0
P(ms jB, δ )
P(ms jA, δ ) 
1  Ph(B)
Ph(B)
qR
1  qR .
It follows from the above inequality, (4) and the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) that
P(mr
B,eδ )
P(mr
A,eδ )  1  Ph(B)Ph(B) qR1  qR .
We may thus conclude that given eδ, action a is optimal after mr. Suppose that mr and
mr0 trigger a mixed action (α, 1   α) s.t. α 2 (qR, 1) given δ. Then it must be that for
s = r, r0
1  Ph(B)
Ph(B)
qR
1  qR =
P(ms jB, δ )
P(ms jA, δ ) .
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It follows from the above equality, (4) and the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) that
1  Ph(B)
Ph(B)
qR
1  qR =
P(mr
B,eδ )
P(mr
A,eδ ) .
We may thus conclude that given eδ, the mixed action (α, 1  α) is optimal after mr.
Suppose that mr and mr0 trigger mixed action (qR, 1  qR) given δ. Then it must be that for
s = r, r0
1  Ph(B)
Ph(B)
qR
1  qR 
P(ms jB, δ )
P(ms jA, δ ) 
qR
1  qR
1  Pl(B)
Pl(B)
.
It follows from the above double inequality, (4) and the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) that
1  Ph(B)
Ph(B)
qR
1  qR 
P(mr
B,eδ )
P(mr
A,eδ )  qR1  qR 1  Pl(B)Pl(B) .
We may thus conclude that given eδ, the mixed action (qR, 1  qR) is optimal after mr.
The same argument can be used to analyze the remaining possible equilibrium actions.
Step 2 There exists no S-optimal equilibrium featuring an equilibrium message mr that sat-
isfies the following. First, it is not only sent for σ = t1R. Second, it triggers a mixed action of R
specifying that a is picked with a probability belonging to (qR, 1).
Proof: Assume an S-optimal equilibrium E featuring a message mr not only sent for
σ = t1R that triggers a mixed action (α, 1  α) of R s.t. α 2 (qR, 1) . For such a mixed action
to be part of the set of Max-Min actions, mr must trigger belief qR when applying prior
Ph(B). Given that mr triggers this belief and that mr is not sent only if σ = t1R, it follows
that mr must be sent with strictly positive probability for some σ < t1R as well as for some
σ > t1R. If this is true, then the S-optimal decision rule is however not implemented in E
given that b is taken with positive probability for some σ < t1R  t1S.
Step 3 If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium in
which no equilibrium message triggers a mixed action (α, 1  α) satisfying α 2 (0, qR).
Proof: Assume that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium E that features δ. By steps
1 and 2, it is without loss of generality to assume that m1 (m2) is the unique message
that triggers a (b) for sure, m3 is the unique message triggering (qR, 1  qR) while for any
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r  4, mr is the unique message triggering (αr, 1  αr) satisfying αr 2 (0, qR) . Denote the
strategy profile featured in E by ϕ.
We now construct a strategy profile ϕ0 that constitutes an S-optimal equilibrium E0
that is such that that for some particular r  4 (call it er), the mixed action (αer, 1  αer) is
never triggered in equilibrium. Profile ϕ0 features the communication strategy δ0 defined
as follows. Strategy δ0 is identical to δ except that if σ 2 t1S, t2S ,
δ0er(σ) = δer(σ) αerqR
and
δ02(σ) = δ2(σ) +

1  αer
qR

δer(σ).
Note that it follows that δ0er(σ)  0 and δ02(σ)  δ2(σ).
Profile ϕ0 assigns the following strategy to R. Pick the mixed action (qR, 1  qR) after
mer. After any other message, pick the same action as in the S-optimal equilibrium E.
We briefly recall some properties of the equilibrium E before checking incentives of S
and R in the putative equilibrium E0. First, the probabilities δ3 (σ) , δ4 (σ) , .. can only be
strictly positive if σ 2 t1S, t2S . Also, δ1(σ) = 1 below t1S and δ2(σ) = 1 above t2S. Moreover,
in E message mr triggers belief qR when applying the prior Pl(B), for any r  4.
We now verify that the constructed strategy δ0 defines a probability distribution over
messages for any σ. We only need to consider σ 2 t1S, t2S. Note that
δ0er(σ)  δer(σ) =  (δ02(σ)  δ2(σ))
while for any remaining r  1, δ0r(σ) = δr(σ). It thus follows that given ∑
r1
δr(σ) = 1 it
also holds true that ∑
r1
δ0r(σ) = 1. Moreover, the equalities defining δ0er(σ) and δ02(σ) imply
that δ0r(σ)  0 for any r.
The putative equilibrium E0 implements the S-optimal decision rule if for σ 2 t1S, t2S
δ02(σ) + ∑
r3
δ0r(σ)(1  αr) = 1  qS.
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The above equality is true since
δ02(σ) + δ0er(σ)(1  qR) + ∑
r3,r 6=er δ
0
r(σ)(1  αr)
= δ2(σ) +

1  αer
qR

δer(σ) + δer(σ) αerqR (1  qR) + ∑r3,r 6=er δ
0
r(σ)(1  αr)
= δ2(σ) + ∑
r3
δr(σ)(1  αr) = 1  qS.
The last equality follows because δ is S-optimal.
We now check incentives of R in the putative equilibrium E0. Recall that in the S-
optimal equilibrium E,
P(merjB, δ)
P(merjA, δ) =
R σ
σ δer(σ) fb(σ)dσR σ
σ δer(σ) fa(σ)dσ
=
qR
1  qR
1  Pl(B)
Pl(B)
. (5)
Given that for any σ δ0er(σ) simply equals δer(σ) multiplied by a constant, it follows that
in equilibrium E0 message mer triggers belief qR when applying the prior Pl(B). R is thus
willing to play a with probability qR after mer in E0. Regarding m2,note that by definition
P(m2jB, δ0)
P(m2jA, δ0)
=
P(m2jB, δ) +
R σ
σ
 
δ02(σ)  δ2(σ)

fb(σ)dσ
P(m2jB, δ) +
R σ
σ
 
δ02(σ)  δ2(σ)

fa(σ)dσ
.
By construction of δ02(σ)
P(m2jB, δ0)
P(m2jA, δ0)
=
P(m2jB, δ) +

1  αerqR
 R σ
σ δer(σ) fb(σ)dσ
P(m2jB, δ) +

1  αerqR
 R σ
σ δer(σ) fa(σ)dσ
.
Since 1  αrqR  0, inequality
P(m2jB,δ)
P(m2jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
and equality (5) imply by the Ratio
Lemma R (Point a)) that P(m2jB,δ
0)
P(m2jA,δ0) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
. Hence it is optimal for R to play b with
probability one after m2 in equilibrium E0.
We have now constructed an equilibrium E0 in which exactly two messages m3 and
mer trigger the mixed action (qR, 1  qR). It follows by the argument given in step 1 that
there exists an equilibrium E00 featuring the following strategy profile. S uses δ00 such that
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δ003 (σ) = δ03 (σ) + δ0er (σ) and δ00er (σ) = 0 and δ00s (σ) = δ0 (σ) for any s 6= 3,er. On the other
hand, R’s strategy is the same in E00 as in E0.
Starting from the S-optimal equilibrium E, we have now constructed an S-optimal
equilibrium E00 featuring one message less than E and which satisfies the same core prop-
erties as E: Message m1 (m2) is the unique message that triggers a (b) for sure, m3 is the
unique message triggering (qR, 1  qR) while for any r  4, mr (if still used) is the unique
message triggering mixed action (αr, 1  αr) satisfying αr 2 (0, qR) . One can iterate this
procedure until obtaining an equilibrium in which only the three messages m1, m2, m3 are
used and trigger respectively a, b or (qR, 1  qR). Note that in order to simplify exposition,
we are assuming a finite number of messages. The arguments carry over to a continuum
of messages.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Outline We here prove Point a). Given Lemma 1.a), we may restrict ourselves to equi-
libria in which only m1, m2 and m3 are sent with positive probability and trigger respec-
tively a for sure, b for sure and (qR, 1  qR). The proof is organized as follows. Step 1
describes the constraints that must be satisfied in an S-optimal equilibrium of the type
described above. Step 2 states additional properties that S’s strategy must satisfy. We
then consider two cases corresponding to respectively t2R  t1S and t2R 2 (1S, t2S]. In the
case of t2R  t1S, we show that if there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists
an S-optimal equilibrium that features the threshold strategy z = t1S (step 3). In the case
of t2R 2 (t1S, t2S], we proceed through two steps. We first show that if there exists any S-
optimal equilibrium, then one can construct an S-optimal equilibrium in which m3 is used
with a certain constant probability if σ 2 (t1S, t2R] (step 4). We then show that if there exists
an S-optimal equilibrium of the latter type, one can construct an S-optimal equilibrium
which is a threshold equilibrium (step 5).
We introduce the following notation. We denote by Pk(ω jmi, δ ) the probability of state
ω conditional on receiving mi when applying prior Pk(B), for k 2 fl, hg . Slightly abusing
notation, we denote by P(mijω, z) and Pk(ω jmi, z ) the counterparts of P(mijω, δ) and
Pk(ω jmi, δ ) for the case where S uses a threshold strategy featuring threshold z.
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Step 1 a) An S-optimal equilibrium featuring a communication strategy δ specifying that only
m1 and m2 are emitted with positive probability exists if and only if
Ph(B jm1, δ )  qR  Pl(B jm2, δ ).
b) An S-optimal equilibrium featuring a strategy δ in which messages m1, m2 and m3 are emit-
ted with positive probability exists if and only if the above double inequality holds and furthermore
Pl(B jm3, δ )  qR.
Proof: We first consider Point a). An S-optimal equilibrium featuring a strategy δ in
which only messages m1, m2 are emitted with positive probability exists if and only if
max fPl(B jm1, δ ), Ph(B jm1, δ )g  qR  min fPl(B jm2, δ ), Ph(B jm2, δ )g .
The LHS inequality ensures that R chooses a with probability one after m1 while the
RHS inequality ensures that R picks b for sure after m2. Note that by definition it is always
true that Pl(B jm1, δ )  Ph(B jm1, δ ) and that Pl(B jm2, δ )  Ph(B jm2, δ ).
We now consider Point b). Consider an equilibrium in which m1, m2 and m3 are emit-
ted with positive probability. Besides the previously imposed conditions, it must also be
that Pl(B jm3, δ )  qR  Ph(B jm3, δ ) so as to ensure that R randomizes after m3. Given
that in an S-optimal equilibrium, m3 is only sent for σ  t1S, it follows by Lemma F that
Ph(B)
1  Ph(B)
Z σ
t1S
δ3(σ) fB(σ)dσZ σ
t1S
δ3(σ) fA(σ)d
 Ph(B)
1  Ph(B)
fB(t1S)
fA(t1S)
=
qS
1  qS ,
i.e. qS  Ph(Bjm3, δ). Hence qR  Ph(B jm3, δ ).
Step 2 a) In any S-optimal equilibrium featuring a communication strategy δ, δ1(σ) = 1 for
σ < t1S and δ2(σ) = 1 for σ > t
2
S. For σ 2

t1S, t
2
S

,
δ1(σ) + δ3(σ)qR = qS. (6)
and δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR and δ3(σ) 
1 qS
1 qR .
b) It holds true that for σ 2 t1S, t2S ,
δ3(σ)  1  qS1  qR =  
1
qR

δ1(σ)  qS   qR1  qR

(7)
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Proof: The equality (6) ensures a is played with probability qS for any σ 2

t1S, t
2
S

as required by the S-optimal decision rule. Equality (6) implies δ3(σ) =
qS δ1(σ)
qR
. From
this latter equality and the fact that δ1(σ) + δ3(σ)  1 it follows that δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR or
equivalently δ3(σ)  1 qS1 qR for all σ 2

t1S, t
2
S

. Equation (7) directly follows from using
δ3(σ) =
qS δ1(σ)
qR
.
Step 3 Suppose that t2R  t1S. If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists an
S-optimal equilibrium that features the threshold strategy z = t1S.
Proof: Suppose first that t2R < t
1
S. Assume that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium
featuring a strategy δ that assigns positive probability to m3 which triggers mixed action
(qR, 1  qR). We know from step 2 that it can only be true that δ3(σ) > 0 if σ 2

t1S, t
2
S

.
Given this and the fact that t2R < t
1
S, it must however then be the case by Lemma F that
Pl(Bjm3,δ)
Pl(Ajm3,δ) >
qR
1 qR , implying that R responds to m3 by choosing action b for sure. It follows
that δ cannot constitute an equilibrium. Note that if an S-optimal equilibrium is such
that only m1 and m2 are used and trigger respectively a for sure and b for sure, then this
equilibrium features the threshold strategy z = t1S.
Suppose now that t2R = t
1
S. Assume that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featur-
ing a strategy δ that assigns positive probability conditional on some signal to m3 which
triggers mixed action (qR, 1  qR). We know from step 2 that it can only be true that
δ3(σ) > 0 if σ 2

t1S, t
2
S

. In order to have Pl(Bjm3,δ)Pl(Ajm3,δ) 
qR
1 qR , it must be that m3 is only sent
for σ = t1S. However, if this is the case then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium where δ
is replaced by a δ0 that is identical to δ except that for σ = t1S, S randomizes between m1
and m2 with probabilities (qS, 1  qS) . This equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium with
threshold z = t1S.
Step 4 Suppose that t2R 2 (t1S, t2S]. If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring a com-
munication strategy δ, then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring δ0 defined as follows:
δ0(σ) =

qS   qR
1  qR , 0,
1  qS
1  qR

if σ 2
h
t1S, t
2
R
i
, (8)
δ0(σ) = δ(σ) if σ /2
h
t1S, t
2
R
i
. (9)
Proof: Since δ is featured in an S-optimal equilibrium, it holds true that P(m1jB,δ)P(m1jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Ph(B)
Ph(B)
, P(m3jB,δ)P(m3jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
and P(m2jB,δ)P(m2jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
. Consider the strategy δ0
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defined above. We shall prove that all message constraints are satisfied given δ0.
Consider first the m1-constraint. Note that
P(m1jB, δ0)
P(m1jA, δ0)
=
P(m1jB, δ) 
R t2R
t1S

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fB(σ)dσ
P(m1jA, δ) 
R t2R
t1S

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fA(σ)dσ
.
Recall that δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR for any σ 2

t1S, t
2
R

as proved in the preceding step. Given
t1R  t1S and Lemma F, it holds true thatR t2R
t1S

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fB(σ)dσR t2R
t1S

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fA(σ)dσ
 qR
1  qR
1  Ph(B)
Ph(B)
. (10)
Using together inequality P(m1jB,δ)P(m1jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Ph(B)
Ph(B)
, inequality (10) and the fact that δ1(σ) 
qS qR
1 qR for σ 2

t2R, t
2
S

, the Ratio Lemma R (Point b)) implies that P(m1jB,δ
0)
P(m1jA,δ0) 
qR
1 qR
1 Ph(B)
Ph(B)
.
Consider now the m3-constraint. Note that
P(m3jB, δ0)
P(m3jA, δ0)
=
P(m3jB, δ) 
R t2R
t1S

δ3(σ)  1 qS1 qR

fB(σ)dσ
P(m3jA, δ) 
R t2R
t1S

δ3(σ)  1 qS1 qR

fA(σ)dσ
=
P(m3jB, δ) + 1qR
R t2R
t1S

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fB(σ)dσ
P(m3jA, δ) + 1qR
R t2R
t1S

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fA(σ)dσ
.
The second above equality uses equation (7). Recall also that δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR for any
σ 2 t1S, t2R . By Lemma F it holds true thatR t2R
t1S

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fB(σ)dσR t2R
t1S

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fA(σ)dσ
 qR
1  qR
1  Pl(B)
Pl(B)
. (11)
Using together inequality P(m3jB,δ)P(m3jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
, inequality (11) and the fact that δ1(σ) 
qS qR
1 qR for any σ 2

t1S, t
2
R

, the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) implies that P(m3jB,δ
0)
P(m3jA,δ0) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
.
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Consider finally the m2-constraint. Since δ02(σ) = 0 if σ  tR2 , Lemma F implies that
P(m2jB,δ0)
P(m2jA,δ0) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
. Hence, δ0 satisfies all message constraints and constitutes an
S-optimal equilibrium.
Step 5 Suppose that t2R 2 (t1S, t2S]. Suppose there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring a
communication strategy δ satisfying δ(σ) =

qS qR
1 qR , 0,
1 qS
1 qR

if σ 2 t1S, t2R . Then there exists
a threshold equilibrium featuring z  t2R.
Proof: Suppose that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring δ with δ(σ) =
qS qR
1 qR , 0,
1 qS
1 qR

whenever σ 2 t1S, t2R. We distinguish two cases. In Case 1, P(m3jB,t2S)P(m3jA,t2S) 
P(m3jB,δ)
P(m3jA,δ) . In Case 2,
P(m3jB,t2S)
P(m3jA,t2S)
> P(m3jB,δ)P(m3jA,δ) . We begin with Case 1 and prove that in this case
there exists a threshold equilibrium with z = t2S.
Consider the m3-constraint. Since δ is used in an S-optimal equilibrium, it holds true
that P(m3jB,δ)P(m3jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
. It follows immediately that P(m3jB,t
2
S)
P(m3jA,t2S)
 qR1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
.
Consider the m1-constraint. Since δ is used in an S-optimal equilibrium, it is true that
P(m1jB,δ)
P(m1jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Ph(B)
Ph(B)
. Note that P(m1jB,t
2
s )
P(m1jA,t2s ) =
P(m1jB,δ) 
R t2S
t2R

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fB(σ)dσ
P(m1jA,δ) 
R t2S
t2R

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fA(σ)dσ
. We know
furthermore that δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR for σ 2

t2R, t
2
S

. Using Lemma F, it thus holds true that
R t2S
t2R

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fB(σ)dσR t2S
t2R

δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR

fA(σ)dσ
 qR
1  qR
1  Pl(B)
Pl(B)
 qR
1  qR
1  Ph(B)
Ph(B)
. (12)
Using together inequality P(m1jB,δ)P(m1jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Ph(B)
Ph(B)
, inequality (12) and the fact that
δ1(σ)  qS qR1 qR for σ 2

t2R, t
2
S

, the Ratio Lemma R (Point b)) implies that P(m1jB,t
2
S)
P(m1jA,t2S)

qR
1 qR
1 Ph(B)
Ph(B)
.
Consider finally the m2-constraint. In a threshold equilibrium featuring z = t2S, m2
is sent if and only if if σ  t2S  t2R. It follows by Lemma F that Pl(Bjm2, t2S)  qS 
qR. Hence, the threshold strategy featuring z = t2S satisfies all equilibrium constraints
corresponding to m1, m2 and m3.
We now examine Case 2, thus assuming P(m3jB,t
2
S)
P(m3jA,t2S)
> P(m3jB,δ)P(m3jA,δ) . We shall show that
we can find a threshold strategy featuring z 2 [t2R, t2S] such that P(m3jB,z)P(m3jA,z) =
P(m3jB,δ)
P(m3jA,δ) ,
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P(m1jB,z)
P(m1jA,z) 
P(m1jB,δ)
P(m1jA,δ) and Pl(Bjm2, z)  qR, implying that the identified threshold strategy
constitutes an equilibrium.
Consider first the m3-constraint. Note that
P(m3jB,t2R)
P(m3jA,t2R)
 P(m3jB,δ)P(m3jA,δ) . To see this note the
following. First, under δ and the threshold strategy z = t2R, m3 is not sent for σ < t
1
S
and sent with probability 1 qS1 qR for σ 2 (t1S, t2R). Second δ3(σ)  0 for σ 2 (t2R, t2S] while
under the threshold equilibrium z = t2R, m3 is sent with probability zero for σ > t
2
R. The
stated inequality then follows by Lemma F. Using the fact that P(m3jB,z)P(m3jA,z) is continuous and
increasing in z as well as the double inequality
P(m3jB, t2R)
P(m3jA, t2R)
 P(m3jB, δ)
P(m3jA, δ) <
P(m3jB, t2S)
P(m3jA, t2S)
,
it follows that there is a z 2 [t2R, t2S] such that
P(m3jB, z)
P(m3jA, z) =
P(m3jB, δ)
P(m3jA, δ) . (13)
Recall that given the threshold strategy z > t1S, m3 is sent with probability
1 qS
1 qR for σ 2
[t1S, z) while it is sent with probability zero otherwise. We thus have
P(m3jB, z)
P(m3jA, z) =
P(m3jB, δ) +
R z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fB(σ)dσ 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fB(σ)dσ
P(m3jA, δ) +
R z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fA(σ)dσ 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fA(σ)dσ
. (14)
Equalities (13) and (14) are compatible only in two scenarios, which we call I and II.
Scenario I is that the termsZ z
t2R

1  qS
1  qR   δ3(σ)

fB(σ)dσ 
Z t2S
z
δ3(σ) fB(σ)dσ (15)
and Z z
t2R

1  qS
1  qR   δ3(σ)

fA(σ)dσ 
Z t2S
z
δ3(σ) fA(σ)dσ (16)
are both zero. Scenario II is that either both of the above terms are strictly positive or both
of these are strictly negative and additionallyR z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fB(σ) 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fB(σ)R z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fA(σ) 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fA(σ)
=
P(m3jB, δ)
P(m3jA, δ) . (17)
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For scenario II, we will now show that the two terms must actually both be strictly
positive. Recall first that by definition P(m3jB,δ)P(m3jA,δ) 
qR
1 qR
1 Pl(B)
Pl(B)
. Second, Lemma F implies
that.
qR
1  qR
1  Pl(B)
Pl(B)

R z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fB(σ)dσR z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fA(σ)dσ
<
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fB(σ)dσR t2S
z δ3(σ) fA(σ)dσ
.
Combining these inequalities impliesR z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fB(σ)dσ 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fB(σ)dσR z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fA(σ)dσ 
R z
t2R
δ3(σ) fA(σ)dσ

R z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fB(σ)dσR z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fA(σ)dσ
<
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fB(σ)dσR t2S
z δ3(σ) fA(σ)dσ
.
Using the above double-inequality and the assumption that (15) and (16) have the same
sign, Ratio Lemma R (Point d)) implies that (15) and (16) are both strictly positive.
Consider now the m1-constraint. We compare
P(m1jB,z)
P(m1jA,z) with
P(m1jB,δ)
P(m1jA,δ) . Using equation
(7), one can write
P(m1jB, z)
P(m1jA, z) =
P(m1jB, δ)  qR
R z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fB(σ)dσ 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fB(σ)dσ

P(m1jA, δ)  qR
R z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fA(σ)dσ 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fA(σ)dσ
 .
(18)
Note that the numerator in the LHS ratio equals the numerator in the RHS ratio. The
same holds true for denominators. It follows that the numerator and the denominator in
the RHS ratio are both strictly positive.
In scenario I, the terms multiplying qR vanish and hence
P(m1jB,z)
P(m1jA,z) =
P(m1jB,δ)
P(m1jA,δ) . It
follows that the m1-constraint is satisfied for the threshold strategy given by z, as it was
satisfied for δ. In scenario II, as in any S-optimal equilibrium, δ is s.t. Ph(B jm1, δ )  qR 
Ph(B jm3, δ ) and thus P(B jm1, δ )  P(B jm3, δ ). Given equation (17), it thus follows that
P(m1jB, δ)
P(m1jA, δ) 
R z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fB(σ)dσ 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fB(σ)dσR z
t2R

1 qS
1 qR   δ3(σ)

fA(σ)dσ 
R t2S
z δ3(σ) fA(σ)dσ
.
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Given this inequality and the equality (18), the R (Point b)) implies that P(m1jB,z
)
P(m1jA,z) 
P(m1jB,δ)
P(m1jA,δ) , so the m1-constraint is satisfied also in scenario II.
Consider finally the m2-constraint. In the constructed threshold equilibrium featur-
ing a threshold z  t2R, m2 is sent if and only if σ  t2R. It follows by Lemma F that
Pl(Bjm2, z)  qR. Hence, we have identified a z 2 [t2R, t2S] such that the threshold strat-
egy z satisfies all three message constraints and thus constitutes an equilibrium.
6.3 Preliminary analysis of constraints
In what follows, we shall study the incentive compatibility constraints of S and call them
respectively m1-, m2- and m3-constraint. We first study each separately, examining com-
parative statics w.r.t. z, e and qR, and then study their pairwise relations. The lemmas ap-
pearing below are proved in the Online Appendix. We introduce some notation in what
follows. In a threshold equilibrium featuring threshold z, we denote by Pk(B jmi, z, qS, e )
the conditional probability of state B given message mi when applying prior Pek (B), for
i 2 f2, 3g . The counterpart for m1 is denoted by Pk(B jm1, z, qR, qS, e ). Note that the latter
expression is a function of qR in contrast to the other two, except in the special case of
z = t1S(e). To stress the fact that Pk(Bjm1, t1S(e), qR, qS, e) is independent of qR, we shall
write Pk(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e). Message m3 is never sent in a threshold equilibrium with
threshold t1S(e) so that Pl(B
m3, t1S(e), qS, e ) is not well defined. We slightly abuse notation
and set Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e) = lim
z!t1S(e)
Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ). Given i 2 f2, 3g and ω 2 fA, Bg,
we let P(mijz, qS, e,ω) denote the probability that mi is sent conditional on the state be-
ing ω. Let P(m1jz, qR, qS, e,ω) denote the equivalent for message m1. Given i 2 f2, 3g,
k 2 fh, lg and ω 2 fA, Bg, we let Pk(ω, mi, z, qS, e) denote the probability that the state is
ω and that mi is sent when using prior Pk(B). Let Pk(ω, m1, z, qR, qS, e) denote the equiva-
lent for message m1.
Lemma M1 i.a) Given e and qS, there is a threshold bz(e) 2 t1S(e), t2S(e) such that the follow-
ing is true. If z < bz(e), there is no qR such that Ph(B jm1, z, qR, qS, e )  qR. If z  bz(e), there is
a unique value Ψ (z, qS, e) 2 (0, qS] such that Ph(B jm1, z, qR, qS, e )  qR iff qR  Ψ (z, qS, e) .
For z  bz(e) the expression Ψ (z, qS, e) satisfies Ph(Bjm1,Ψ (z, qS, e) , qS, e) = Ψ (z, qS, e) and
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is continuous as well as strictly decreasing in z.
i.b) If bz(e) > t1S(e) then Ψ (bz(e), qS, e) = qS. If bz(e) = t1S(e) then Ψ (bz(e), qS, e) =
Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)  qS.
ii.a) Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) is continuous and strictly increasing in e.
ii.b) There is a constant e1 2

0, 12

such that Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) < qS iff e < e1.
ii.c) If e  e1 then bz(e) = t1S(e). If e > e1 then bz(e) > t1S(e).
Lemma M2 i.a) Pl(B jm2, z, qS, e ) is continuous and strictly increasing in z
i.b) Pl(Bjm2, t2S(e), qS, e) > qS.
ii.a) Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) is continuous and strictly decreasing in e.
ii.b) There is a constant e2 2

0, 12

such that Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) < qS iff e > e2.
Lemma M3 i.a) Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) < qS 8e > 0 and z.
i.b) Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) is continuous and strictly increasing in z.
ii.a) Pl(B
m3, t1S(e), qS, e ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in e.
ii.b) lim
e!0
Pl(B
m3, t1S(e), qS, e ) = qS.
ii.c) Pl(B
m3, t1S(e), qS, e ) approaches 0 for e! 12 .
Lemma M4 a) There is an e13 2 (0, e1) such that
Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e) > Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)
iff e < e13.
b) Given e  e13 it holds true that bz(e) = t1S(e) and that
Ψ(z, qS, e) < Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ), 8z 2

t1S(e), t
2
S(e)
i
.
c) If e > e13 and Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e) > Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e) then there exists some
z 2
hbz(e), t2S(e)i nnt1S(e)o
such that Ψ(z, qS, e) > Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) iff z 2 [bz(e), z).
d) If e > e13 and Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e)  Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e) thenΨ(z, qS, e)  Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e )
for z 2 bz(e), t2S(e).
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Lemma M5 It holds true that Pl(B jm2, z, qS, e ) > Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ), 8z 2

t1S(e), t
2
S(e)

.
Lemma M6 a) There is an e12 2

e13, 12

such that
Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) > Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
iff e > e12.
b) If e2 < e1 then e2 < e12 < e1. If e2 > e1 then e2 > e12 > e1. If e2 = e1 then e2 = e12 = e1.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Outline The proof of Point i. is given in steps 1-4 and is organized as follows. We first
study the case of e  e13 and then examine the case of e > e13. The latter case subdivides
into two subcases I and II. In subcase I, Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e) > Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e) whereas in
subcase II the latter inequality is reversed. The proof of Point ii. appears in step 5.
Step 1 a) A threshold equilibrium featuring z = t1S(e) exists if and only if
Ph(B jm1, z, qR, qS, e )  qR  Pl(B jm2, z, qS, e ).
b) A threshold equilibrium featuring z > t1S(e) exists if and only if the above inequalities hold and
in addition Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e )  qR.
Proof: This was proved in step 1 of the proof of Proposition 1.
Step 2 Assume that e  e13. There exists some threshold equilibrium if and only if
qR  Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
This implies that q
R
(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
Proof: Let e  e13 so by definition (see Lemma M4) it holds true that
Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)  Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e).
From Lemma M3, we know that Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e)  qS, 8z . From Lemma M5, we
know that Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) < Pl(B jm2, z, qS, e ), 8z.
Consider first qR < Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e). There exists no t1S(e)-equilibrium as the m1-
constraint is violated. We know from Lemma M3 that Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) is increasing in z
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so that for any z > t1S(e), Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) > Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e). Hence, for z > t1S(e),
qR < Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) which means that the m3-constraint is violated. There thus exists
no threshold equilibrium with z > t1S(e).
Consider qR 2

Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e), Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e)

. Given that it holds true
that Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e) < Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e), it follows that qR  Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e).
For such values of qR, the m1- and the m2-constraints are thus satisfied in a t1S(e)-equilibrium.
Hence, the t1S(e)-equilibrium (which does not involve m3) exists.
Consider qR 2
 
Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e), Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e)

. For any such qR, there ex-
ists a threshold equilibrium for the unique value of z at which qR = Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ).
For such a pair qR, z, the m3-constraint is satisfied because qR = Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ). The m1-
constraint is satisfied because we know from Lemma M4 that for any z, Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) 
Ψ(z, qS, e). The m2-constraint is satisfied because qR = Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) while we know
from Lemma M5 that Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) < Pl(B jm2, z, qS, e ).
Consider finally qR 2
 
Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e), qS

. In a putative t2S(e)-equilibrium, the
m1-constraint is satisfied because we know from Lemma M5 that Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e) >
Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e). The m3-constraint is satisfied by assumption. The m2-constraint is satis-
fied because we know from Lemma M2 that qS < Pl(Bjm2, t2S(e), qS, e). Hence the t2S(e)-
equilibrium exists. Figure A below illustrates the case of e < e13. We assume the same
information structure as in previous figures, setting qS = .85 and e = .12.
Figure A
Step 3 (Subcase I) Assume e > e13 and Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e) > Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e). There exists
some threshold equilibrium if and only qR 2 [Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ), qS] , where z is the unique
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value in the set
bz(e), t2S(e) nft1S(e)g such that Ψ(z, qS, e) = Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ). This implies
that q
R
(e) = Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ), for the above defined z.
Proof: We know from Lemma M4 that there exists some z 2 bz(e), t2S(e) n t1S(e)	
such that Ψ(z, qS, e) = Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) while in contrast Ψ(z, qS, e) > Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e )
for z 2 [bz(e), z) and Ψ(z, qS, e) < Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ) for z 2 (z, t2S(e)].
Consider first qR < Pl(B jm3, z, qS, e ). For such values of qR, there exists no z such that
qR  max fPl(B jm3, z, qS, e ),Ψ(z, qS, e)g . It follows that for such values of qR, there exists
no threshold equilibrium.
Consider qR 2

Pl(Bjm3, z, qS, e), Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e)

. For any such qR, there exists a
threshold-z equilibrium for the value of z defined by the intersection of the horizontal line
qR with Pl(Bjm3, z, qS, e). For any such pair qR, z, we know that the m1- and m3-constraints
are satisfied because it holds true that qR  Pl(Bjm3, z, qS, e) and qR  Ψ(z, qS, e). For any
such pair qR, z, the m2-constraint is satisfied because for any z, we know from Lemma M5
that Pl(Bjm3, z, qS, e) < Pl(Bjm2, z, qS, e).
Consider finally qR 2
 
Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e), qS

. For these values of qR, the t2S(e)-
equilibrium exists. Indeed, the m1- and m3-constraints are satisfied because
qR  max
n
Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e),Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e)
o
.
Furthermore, the m2-constraint is satisfied because qS < Pl(Bjm2, t2S(e), qS, e). Subcase I is
illustrated in Figure B below. We assume the same information structure as in previous
figures, setting qS = .85 and e = .19.
Figure B
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Step 4 (Subcase II) Assume e > e13 and Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qR, qS, e)  Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e). There
exists a threshold-z equilibrium if and only if qR  Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e). This implies that qR(e) =
Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e).
Proof: Consider first qR < Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e). SinceΨ(z, qS, e) is decreasing in z on
bz(e), t2S(e) ,
there exists no z 2 bz(e), t2S(e) such that qR > Ψ(z, qS, e).
Consider instead qR  Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e). For any such qR, the t2S(e)-equilibrium exists.
The m1- and m3-constraints are satisfied because
qR  Ψ(t2S(e), qS, e)  Pl(Bjm3, t2S(e), qS, e).
The m2-constraint is satisfied because qS < Pl(Bjm2, t2S(e), qS, e) (see Lemma M2). Sub-
case II is illustrated in the figure below. We assume the same information structure as in
previous figures, setting qS = .85 and e = .24.
Figure C
Step 5 This proves Point ii. Note that for e  e13, we have qR(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
We know from Lemma M1 that Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) is continuous and strictly increas-
ing in e.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
6.5.1 Proof of Part i.
Outline Point i.a) is proved in step 1. Point i.b) is proved in steps 2-3. Point i.c) is proved
in step 4. Point i.d) is proved in step 5. Recall in what follows the following inequalities.
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First, if e1 6= e2 then e12 is strictly between e1 and e2 while if e1 = e2 then e12 = e1. Second,
e13 < minfe12, e1g.
Step 1 Let e2 < e1. An S-optimal equilibrium using only two messages exists for some qR if
and only if e  e12.
Proof: Given that only two messages are allowed, there exists an S-optimal equilibrum
if and only if there exists a threshold equilibrium with threshold t1S(e) (see Proposition
1.b)). A t1S(e)-equilibrium exists for some qR  qS if and only if Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) 
min

qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
	
. To see this, recall that given qR  qS, a t1S(e)-equilibrium
exists if and only if qR satisfies
Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)  qR  min
n
qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
o
.
From Lemma M1 we know that Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)  qs iff e  e1. From Lemma
M6, we know that Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)  Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) iff e  e12. Now, note that
e12 < e1. Consequently, if e 2 (0, e12] there exists a non empty interval of values of qR for
which there exists a t1S(e)-equilibrium while if e > e12 then no value of qR is compatible
with a t1S(e)-equilibrium.
Step 2 (Lower bound with two messages) Let e2 < e1. If e  e12 then
q0
R
(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
Proof: The fact that q0
R
(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) follows immediately from the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions stated in step 1. Recall that Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) and
Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) are both independent of qR.
Step 3 (Lower bound with three messages) Let e2 < e1. If e  e13 then
q
R
(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
If e 2 (e13, e12] then qR(e) = Pl(Bjm3, z, qR, qS, e) for some z > t1S(e) that satisfies
Pl(Bjm3, z, qR, qS, e) < Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
Proof: The characterization of q
R
(e) is provided in the proof of Proposition 2. We know
from Lemma M4 that e13 2 (0, e12) and that if e > e13 then
Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) > Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e).
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We also know from Lemma M3 that Pl(Bjm3, z, qR, qS, e) is decreasing in z for z 2

t1S(e), t
2
S(e)

.
Step 4 (Upper bound with two messages) Let e2 < e1. If e  e2 then q0R(e) = qS. If
e 2 (e2, e12] then q0R(e) = Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) < qS.
Proof: The fact that q0R(e) = min

qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
	
follows immediately from
the necessary and sufficient conditions stated in step 1. The constant e2 is such that
Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) < qS iff e > e2. We know from Lemma M6 that e2 < e12 given our as-
sumption that e2 < e1. It follows that if e  e2 then we have min

qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
	
=
qS while if e > e2 we instead have min

qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
	
= Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e).
Step 5 The lower bound q0
R
(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) is continuous and strictly in-
creasing in e for e 2 (0, e12]. The upper bound q0R(e) = qS for e 2 (0, e2]. The upper bound
q0R(e) = Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) is continuous and strictly decreasing in e for e 2 (e2, e12]. Also,
Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e2), qS, e2) = qS.
Proof: This was proved in Lemmas M1 and M2.
6.5.2 Proof of Part ii.
Outline The proof is very similar to that of Part i. of Proposition 3. Point ii.a) is proved in
step 1. Point ii.b) is proved in steps 2-3. Point ii.c) is proved in step 4. Point ii.d) is proved
in step 5.
Step 1 Let e2  e1. An S-optimal equilibrium using only two messages exists for some qR if
and only if e  e1.
Proof: Given that only two messages are allowed, there exists an S-optimal equilibrum
if and only if there exists a threshold equilibrium with threshold t1S(e) (see Proposition
1.b)). A t1S(e)-equilibrium exists for some qR  qS if and only if Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) 
min

qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
	
. To see this, recall that given qR  qS, a t1S(e)-equilibrium
exists if and only if qR satisfies
Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)  qR  min
n
qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
o
.
From Lemma M1 we know that Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)  qs iff e  e1. From Lemma 6,
we know Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e)  Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) iff e  e12. Now, note that e1 < e12.
Consequently, if e 2 (0, e1] then there exists a non empty interval of values of qR for
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which there exists a t1S(e)-equilibrium while if e > e1 then no qR is compatible with a
t1S(e)-equilibrium.
Step 2 (Lower bound with two messages) Let e2  e1. If e  e1 then
q0
R
(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
Proof: Identical to the proof of step 2 for Point i.
Step 3 (Lower bound with three messages) Let e2  e1. If e  e13 then
q
R
(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
If e 2 (e13, e1] then qR(e) = Pl(Bjm3, z, qR, qS, e) for some z > t1S(e) that satisfies
Pl(Bjm3, z, qR, qS, e) < Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e).
Proof: The characterization of q
R
(e) is provided in the proof of Proposition 2. We know
from Lemma M4 that e13 2 (0, e1) and that if e > e13 then
Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) > Pl(Bjm3, t1S(e), qS, e).
We also know from Lemma M3 that Pl(Bjm3, z, qR, qS, e) is decreasing in z for z 2

t1S(e), t
2
S(e)

.
Step 4 (Upper bound with two messages) Let e2  e1. If e  e1 then q0R(e) = qS.
Proof: The fact that q0R(e) = min

qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
	
follows immediately from
the necessary and sufficient conditions stated in step 1. From Lemma M2, recall that the
constant e2 is such that if e < e2 then Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e) > qS. Given that e1  e2, it
follows that for any e  e1, min

qS, Pl(Bjm2, t1S(e), qS, e)
	
= qS so that q0R(e) = qS.
Step 5 The lower bound q0
R
(e) = Ph(Bjm1, t1S(e), 0, qS, e) is continuous and strictly increas-
ing in e for e 2 (0, e1]. The upper bound q0R(e) = qS for e 2 (0, e1].
Proof: This was proved in Lemma M1.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Outline Steps 1-2 prove Point i. whereas steps 3-4 prove Point ii.
Step 1 Given qS, qR, e, the simple D-equilibrium exists iff
Pel (B)
1  Pel (B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
 qR 
Peh(B)
1  Peh(B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
. (19)
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Proof: R is willing to randomize after m1 iff (19) holds true. On the other hand, R is
willing to take action b for sure after message m2 iff
qR
1 qR 
Pel (B)
1 Pel (B)
1 FB(t2S(e))
1 FA(t2S(e))
. The latter
inequality is always satisfied given that by definition qS1 qS 
Pel (B)
1 Pel (B)
1 FB(t2S(e))
1 FA(t2S(e))
. To see
this, note that t2S(e) is by definition such that
qS
1 qS =
Pel (B)
1 Pel (B)
fB(t2S(e))
fA(t2S(e))
and apply Lemma F.
Step 2 Fix qS. For any e > 0 and given qR  qS, there exist thresholds qDR (e) and
qDR (e) satisfying q
D
R
(e) < qDR (e)  qS such that the simple D-equilibrium exists iff qR 2h
qD
R
(e) , qDR (e)
i
.
Proof: It follows immediately from step 1 that
qD
R
(e)
1 qD
R
(e) =
Pel (B)
1 Pel (B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
and q
D
R (e)
1 qDR (e)
=
Peh(B)
1 Peh(B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
. Note that for any e 2 (0, 12),
Pel (B)
1 Pel (B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
< qS1 qS (by the definition of
t2S(e) and applying Lemma F) so that q
D
R
(e) < qS. Note furthermore that for e > 0, it is
trivially true that
Pel (B)
1  Pel (B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
<
Peh(B)
1  Peh(B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
.
Step 3 It holds true that lim
e!0
qD
R
(e) = lim
e!0
q
R
(e) .
Proof: Note that lim
e!0
q
R
(e)
1 q
R
(e) = lime!0
Peh(B)
1 Peh(B)
FB(t1S(e))
FA(t1S(e))
which is equal to
lim
e!0
qD
R
(e)
1  qD
R
(e)
= lim
e!0
Pel (B)
1  Pel (B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
given that lim
e!0
t1S(e) = lime!0
t2S(e) and lime!0
Pel (B) = lime!0
Peh(B).
Step 4 For any e, qD
R
(e) is strictly decreasing in e and qDR (e) is weakly increasing in e.
Proof: Regarding qD
R
(e) , note first that P
e
l (B)
1 Pel (B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
is strictly decreasing in e, as
shown in Lemma E2 which is stated and proved in section 3 of the Online Appendix.
Note furthermore that lim
e! 12
Pel (B)
1 Pel (B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
= 0. Regarding qDR (e) , note that
Peh(B)
1 Peh(B)
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
is strictly increasing in e. To see this, note first t2S(e) increases in e so that
FB(t2S(e))
FA(t2S(e))
increases
in e. Note also that P
e
h(B)
1 Peh(B)
increases in e. It follows that qDR (e) is strictly increasing in e
until it reaches value qS, after which it remains equal to qS.
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6.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Outline Step 1 analyzes equilibrium and payoffs in the absence of ambiguity. Steps 2 and
3 analyze equilibrium and payoffs in the presence of ambiguity with a focus on the simple
D-equilibrium prediction. Step 3 shows the continuity in qR and e of the expected payoff
of S in the simple D-equilibrium under ambiguity e > 0 and prior Pek (B). Step 4 is about
comparing expected payoffs under the no ambiguity and the ambiguity scenario. Step 5
uses the previously established facts in order to conclude. In what follows, we slightly
abuse notation and let q
R
(0) = lim
e!0
q
R
(e) . The threshold q
R
(0) thus denotes the lowest
value of qR for which influential communication is possible in the absence of ambiguity.
We similarly let tiS(0) = lime!0
tiS(e), for i 2 f1, 2g .
Step 1 Given e = 0 and qR < qR (0) , the unique equilibrium outcome is such that R always
picks action b. R obtains expected payoff Π0(qS) =  12 qS.
Proof: Recall that under e = 0, if qR 6= qR (0) the S-optimal equilibrium is the only
equilibrium with influential communication. For e = 0 and qR < qR (0) there exists no
S-optimal equilibrium. It follows that given e = 0 and qR < qR (0) , there is no influential
communication. In the absence of any influential communication and given a unique
prior P(B) = 12 , R simply picks the ex ante optimal action which is b given qR  qS < 12 .
Step 2 a) For any e 2

0, 12

, qD
R
(e) is continuous and strictly decreasing. b) q
R
(0) =
lim
e!0
qD
R
(0). c) For any e 2

0, 12

and qR 2
h
qD
R
(e), q
R
(0)
i
, there exists an equilibrium imple-
menting decision rule D (qS, qR, e) .
Proof: Given e, recall that threshold qD
R
(e) is the lowest qR compatible with the ex-
istence of the simple D-equilibrium. Points a) and b) were proved in Proposition 4. It
follows from Points a) and b) that for any e 2

0, 12

, qD
R
(e) < q
R
(0). Point c) follows
immediately from the facts stated in Points a) and b).
Step 3 Denote by ΠD(e, qS, qR, k) the expected payoff of S given decision rule D (qS, qR, e)
under prior Pek (B), k 2 fl, hg. ΠD(e, qS, qR, k) is continuous in qR and e.
Proof: The expected payoff of S given decision rule D (qS, qR, e) is given by
ΠD(e, qS, qR, k)
=  (1  Pek (B))
h
FA(t2S(e))(1  qR) + 1  FA(t2S(e))
i
qS   Pek (B)FB(t2S(e))qR(1  qS).
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To see this, recall that under decision rule D(qS, qR, e), R plays b with probability 1  qR
for σ < t2S(e) and plays b with probability one for σ  t2S(e). It follows that given state
ω 2 fA, Bg , under decision rule D(qS, qR, e) R chooses b with probability Fω(t2S(e))(1 
qR) + 1   Fω(t2S(e)). R instead chooses a with probability Fω(t2S(e)qR. The expression
ΠD(e, qS, qR, k) is trivially continuous in qR. It is continuous in e because t2S(e) and P
e
k (B)
are continuous in e.
Step 4 There exists an e > 0 and a function q
R
(e) defined on [0, e) and satisfying q
R
(e) <
q
R
(0) 8e 2 [0, e) such that the following is true. If the pair e, qR satisfies e 2 [0, e) and
qR 2 [qR(e), qR (0)], then ΠD(e, qS, qR, k) > Π0(qS), 8k 2 fl, hg .
Proof: For fixed e, qS, qR, k, we compare the welfare of S in an equilibrium implement-
ing D (qS, qR, e) to S’s welfare in an equilibrium in which b is always chosen. Note first
that
ΠD(0, qS, qR (0) , l) = ΠD(0, qS, qR (0) , h).
This is true because t1S(0) = t
2
S(0). Second, note that for any qR  qS
ΠD(0, qS, qR, h) Π0(qS) > 0. (20)
To see this note that given e = 0, S favours a scenario in which D (qS, qR, 0) is imple-
mented to one in which R always chooses action b. Recall that t1S(0) = t
2
S(0) and note that
for e = 0, the S-optimal decision rule is to choose a for sure below t1S(0) and b for sure
above t1S(0). The decision rule D (qS, qR, 0) admittedly differs from the S-optimal decision
rule but it dominates the "always pick b" rule. It yields a strictly higher payoff than the
"always pick b” rule for σ < t1S(0) by ensuring that a is picked with positive probability.
It yields the same payoff as the latter for σ  t1S(0). A special case of the inequality (20) is
ΠD(0, qS, qR (0) , h) Π0(qS) > 0.
Note thatΠD(e, qS, qR, l) andΠD(e, qS, qR, h) are continuous in e and qR. The statement
follows.
Step 5 Given a pair e, qR satisfying e 2 (0, e) and qR 2
h
max
n
qD
R
(e), qR(e)
o
, q
R
(0)
i
there exists an equilibrium implementing decision rule D (qS, qR, e) and furthermore
min fΠD(e, qS, qR, l),ΠD(e, qS, qR, h)g > Π0(qS).
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Proof: Applying simultaneously the statements of steps 2 and 4, the above statement
follows.
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